Political Possibilities
Mapping a Common Good Majority

Five Years of Surveys Mapping Israeli Social-Political Values
The news confirms Shaharit’s argument from the beginning of its work – that partners can be found everywhere if you look beyond the stereotypes and search for sociological trends that are emerging and can be fostered. “The news confirms Shaharit’s argument from the beginning of its work – that partners can be found everywhere if you look beyond the stereotypes and search for sociological trends that are emerging and can be fostered.”
The future of Israel offers far more political possibilities than are currently perceived. While popular stereotypes of each of President Rivlin’s four tribes suggests a culture war between competing and often conflicting worldviews, also expressed through political allegiances, these stereotypes are rooted in real but only partial truths. The survey data dramatically shows that a richer exploration highlights dramatic differences within each of Israel’s sociologies. These suggest the possibility for different alliances and connections. In the muddy middle of the political map, we see dynamics in each tribe of Israel navigating the relationship between traditional and liberal identities, creating new possibilities that are less binary and more integrated: that one can be both Haredi and Israeli, Jewish and Israeli, Arab and Israeli. The nature of these integrations will define the politics of the coming years, and the political alignments that can emerge.

Dominant strands within Haredi society divide between “separatist” and “conversion” trends – either wanting to keep the wall between Haredim and the rest of Israeli society as high as possible or wanting to have a Haredi worldview become the dominant frame for Israel as a whole. However, fully half of Haredi society prescribes to neither of these approaches. From integrationists who are becoming more and more part of the fiber of the larger society, leaning right-wing along with the rest of the non-Haredi society, to separatists who have moral concerns about the Israeli politic and politically lean left, one can sense the monolithic hold of Haredi politics opening, and new political partnerships emerging. The local elections of 2018, particularly in Beit Shemesh and Jerusalem, with Haredi votes supporting non-Haredi candidates, were a harbinger of things to come. President Rivlin did not include the Mizrachi population as a separate tribe, folding them into the secular, religious and Haredi camp. But paying attention to those with origins from North African and Middle Eastern countries, and their social-political allegiances, offers a bellwether for Israel as a whole. While their political extremes make stark choices between their “Israeli” (read: secular) identity and their Jewish identity, and even more significantly their Mizrachi identities, the massive middle sees their sense of Jewishness and their sense of Israeliness as equal parts of their identities. Political choices that demand allegiance to one identity and not the other are less attractive for the vast majority of Mizrachim than ones that embrace both of these identities. Traditional and secular sentiments, with their political impulses, are intertwined, and suggest the kind of politics that speaks to a clear majority. Israeli Arab society, much like Haredi society, is undergoing major shifts. While the perception of the community from the majority of Israeli Jews is often of a population alienated from Israel and the Jewish state, it actually represents only a minority of the Arab population, in particular that of a socio-economic and secular elite. Large percentages of the Arab population are happy in their lives, and many credit Israel as contributing to their opportunities and well-being, even while experiencing significant institutional discrimination. And traditional religious Arabs, who form an overwhelming majority of Israeli Arab society, are not substantially different than their more secularized counterparts in a desire to be part of society – to have more Jewish friends, to enter the Israeli civil service. They feel comfortable amid Jewish Israelis, and by and large aren’t afraid, even in times of tension with Israel’s Arab neighbors.

We found that Israelis are as a whole deeply committed to tradition, and simultaneously
committed to modern life. Liberal leaning views about women’s role in home, workplace and politics, for example, were shared by a clear majority across the surveys. And there is a broad consensus, crossing all of the tribes of Israel, for a civic agenda that builds a more democratic economy, beyond the social-democratic and capitalism options currently offered. Finally, and significantly, the vast majority of Israelis believe that they have the power to effect change — a critical component in building a vibrant democratic culture.
Introduction

About Shaharit And The Shaharit Surveys

Shaharit was founded in 2012 on the premonition that the polarized nature of the Israeli political debate was not the whole story of Israeli society, but that it was increasingly a self-fulfilling prophecy. Under the radar screen, we believed, there was a different reality. Although often radically different worlds of meaning hold different visions for Israel’s future, we believed there was a real desire among many in each of Israel’s “tribes” to find common ground, and to build a future of living well, together. For the past five years Shaharit has worked hard to build that common ground - in thought and in action - and has built an ever-growing community of thinkers, social-political leaders and activists from the full spectrum of Israeli society showing that such a future is indeed possible. After five years of working with the most unlikely of partners, we believe more than ever in a realistic optimism which confronts the complex reality of Israeli society with a full measure of hope.

The Shaharit surveys are unique, designed to inform Shaharit’s work by digging deeper into Israeli society, mapping its contours, and exposing who and where can be found the partners for building common cause. After an initial 1000-person survey, with proportional representation from all of Israel’s major demographics, we began surveying each of the “tribes” of Israel. What interested us were the subterranean currents which are often missed when groups are described as a homogeneous block. It is a sociological fact that when “we” often think of “our” grouping, whether “we” are liberal or Arab or Haredi or National Religious or Russian or Ethiopian, we see it as having a wide variety of viewpoints that can’t be easily defined or described, but “they” are seemingly always one-dimensional: from settlers to Medinat Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv secularists) to Haredim to Arabs – “they” all are the same. We all know that is preposterous, yet we invariably ignore the differences. Using statistical methods called factor and cluster analysis that are effectively used in marketing to discover target consumer groups, we have divided each of the sociologies surveyed into multiple subgroups, describing their shared values and thus discovering the potential partners for working together for the Common Good. The news confirms Shaharit’s argument from the beginning of its work – that partners can be found everywhere if you look beyond the stereotypes and search for sociological trends that are emerging and can be fostered.
Introduction

The question “There are those that say that the State should be first of all for its Jewish citizens, and the Arabs should be second-class citizens. Do you agree or disagree?” immediately invites the stereotype of Israeli Jews, but also its counterpoint. As expected, a large majority (over 80%) of self-identified left-wingers disagreed with the statement, while a significant percentage of right-wingers (45%) agreed, with the rest of the self-identified (centrists; unidentified) distributed as expected along the political spectrum. But instead of defining left-wingers as supportive of equal citizenship and right-wingers as holding a non-democratic view of citizenship, a better question to ask is who are the right-wingers who are supportive of equal citizenship (close to 50%), as well as the left-wingers (a little over 10%) who aren’t. In other words, the stereotype of Israeli society only takes us so far, and opening up the data beyond the stereotypes goes a long way in opening up political possibilities. Understanding the 50% of right-wing identified Israelis who support equal citizenship for all would help in creating a different social contract with a wider base of support than the one which the current left-right divide describes. It is worth noting that only 14% of Israeli Jews define themselves as “left” - 8% as moderate left and 6% as solid left - while 42% define themselves as “right”, with 27% defining themselves as center and 7% as independent.

A Jewish State, A Religious State

Take for example questions of religion and state. When asked whether they would support a friend being married outside of the rabbinate for reasons of conscience, rather than asking whether one supports civil marriage in principle, 66% of Israeli Jews would find that at the least acceptable, many desirable. Our intuition, proven correct, was that moving the discussion from a theoretical and principled one of rights, to a personal one of relationships, would create a broader consensus around issues. When asked whether they support the spirit of Shabbat being maintained by closing most commercial activity, while allowing cultural events and public transportation in order to get to them, 61% supported the configuration. Here we surmised that by affirming a clear commitment to the value of Shabbat observance in the public sphere, there could be wider support for a different type of status-quo. Reframing the debate in terms that are relational and supportive of a Jewish public sphere can allow a different kind of conversation to take place.

The Economy, Social Protests and Social Change

And while Israeli public discourse focuses primarily on what divides us, in the wake of the social protests of 2011 social-economic issues drew a wide consensus. 70% of the respondents supported the social protest movement, 43% of them enthusiastically. Still, it is important to note, the respondents were split on their interpretation of the underlying values of the social protest - many seeing it “simply” as a consumer revolt against the cost of living, while many others saw it as asking more fundamental questions about the economic system. When asked generally about which economic policies they support, respondents rejected overwhelmingly tinkering with either the current economic mindset or returning to a revised version of the welfare state. 67% supported a different system based on a “more democratic economy,” crossing all sociologies. And in an encouraging statistic – over 80% of respondents believe that they can effect social change in Israel, an important sentiment for democratic societies.
Jews And Arabs In Israel

79% of Israeli Arab respondents are happy with their lives in Israel, and 57% feel connected to Israeli society, while 31% feel alienated. These numbers are confirmed in our more expansive 2017 survey among the Arab population, and suggest a far greater sense of happiness and belonging than is often perceived from the public discourse. Economic prosperity, living in an open society and a democratic system of government relative to Arab countries were all cited as being valued.

The Conflict

Jewish respondents divided along political lines as to the factors that make them resistant to progress towards a peace agreement. Among self-identified right-wing respondents (as well as “a-political”), a steady 30% cited their commitment to the greater Land of Israel as the primary reason to resist any peace agreement, although a majority cited other factors. Among centrists and left-wingers, security interests were the primary factor, also in the 30% range. Interestingly, in every political affiliation, the sense that the Palestinians do not accept the right of the Jews to a country is the second-most cited reason for resisting a settlement. The data shows that a commitment to the Greater Land of Israel is not the predominant reason for opposing progress towards peace, even on the right; and that, in addition to security concerns, the sense among Jews that their right to a nation-state is not accepted by the Palestinians is a central reason for opposition to a peace process across the political spectrum of Israeli Jews.

Concerning the converse question - what factors lead to potentially supporting an agreement - all sides give a high rank to increasing security as a factor that would influence their evaluation of an agreement, with leftists placing it as the most important factor. Leftists are also the only group that give significant weight to considerations of ruling over the Palestinians and whether Israel has a right to be in the territories as a reason to have an agreement. Interestingly, among all other groups, the fear of Palestinians in the territories becoming citizens of Israel ranked as the most important consideration, and security considerations was next in ranking. And finally, across the board, when having to choose between human rights considerations and security, all political affiliations chose security considerations, predictably growing in percentages as one moves from left to right on the political map.
Introduction

Massive data at first glance supports stereotypes often held of the Haredi population in Israel. A wide consensus of the respondents support: obeying the authority of the Rabbinic leadership, even when it contradicts personal opinions (77%); satisfaction with a potential Haredi majority in Israel (75%); a desire for Israel to be governed by halacha (82%); separation of men and women in the public space (72%); arranged marriages (72%) with no family planning (61%); not interested in a workplace with men and women together (60%); no exposure to non-Haredi media (72%); opposed to being forced to serve in the army (85%); Haredi education provides the best preparation for life (88%); the Haredim see their role as the preservers of Judaism (89%).

Even in these data points, one should be curious about who exactly is the minority that hold counter opinions. More suggestive are the responses to questions where there clearly is no consensus, showing fissures in an imagined Haredi singularity: those that don’t study in yeshiva should do the army or other public service (42%); in favor of Haredim in higher education (30%); opposed to religious coercion, in either direction (71%). And at times, a growing consensus points in opposite directions, towards a shifting landscape of change: wanting some measure of secular education in addition to religious education (68%); open to living in mixed neighborhoods (70%); women in managerial positions (57%).

Importantly, although not surprisingly, there is a strong correlation between those Haredim that live in mixed neighborhoods, are in the workforce, have pursued some level of a secular education, have contact with a non-Haredi population, are exposed to internet and non-Haredi media and culture, and positive attitudes about these trends. So, for example, the fact that 76% of Haredim are in constant contact with non-Haredim both predicts but also enforces trends towards greater integration. And among those who are in greater contact and desire for contact with the larger society, we also see an “Israelization” of political attitudes, supporting attitudes skewing often to the extreme right-wing on political issues. For example, 47% hold that Arabs should be second-class citizens. Across the board in Haredi society, respondents report some level of volunteer and contribution to charity (76%; חסדים); and 89% are open to partaking in such activity for the non-Haredi population, as well.

In order to understand better the conflicting directions of Haredi society, we mapped seven different typologies built around shared social values, using a proven statistical methodology called factor analysis. The results are a first-time description of Haredi society according to value clusters, rather than the usual description based on the Haredi community from which they come – Lithuanian, Hasidic sect, Mizrachi, etc. Here is a description of each of the typologies, which allows us to have a more nuanced view of the values that comprise Haredi society today, and where partners for a future of the Common Good can be found today:

1. “Four Cubits of Halakha” (or: Hard-Core Haredim—Separatists), 30.5%

This is the biggest subgroup. The defining characteristic of this group is their desire for complete separation from the rest of the population and a clear desire that Israel will be a halachic state. The members of this subgroup live a lifestyle with an uncompromising religious faith and commitment. This commitment is expressed by...
a complete obedience to Rabbis, strong support for gender separation in public spaces, including workplaces, and opposition to family planning. The members of this subgroup live a segregated life, both socially and culturally, from the non-Haredi population. Most of them live in separate neighborhoods and few are willing to live in mixed neighborhoods, or to get to know secular people. When they go on vacation, it’s important for them that it’s to a place with only Haredim. They’re not interested in integrating into the State of Israel and don’t identify with it. As such, they object – more than the other subgroupings – to the enlistment of young Haredim into the army. Their need to self-segregate is also expressed by objecting to the consumption of non-Haredi media. Most of them don’t have access to the internet, and they don’t read books written by secular or non-Jewish authors. In all matters of education, they object to secular studies and prefer an exclusively religious education system.

**Defining Demographic Characteristics:** Two-thirds of the members of this subgroup have an income that is below the average (the poorest of any subgroup), a third of them are learning in Yeshiva, about half identify as “Lithuanian” (Haredim who are not Hasidic or Sephardic), and they have relatively more children than the members of the other subgroups.

**2. Want to be the Majority in a Theocracy (or: Takeover), 21.7%**

The defining characteristic of the members of this subgroup is their desire to integrate into the State of Israel. This desire is expressed by their support of non-Yeshiva learners joining the army and in their support of Haredim joining the workforce, but ultimately they desire to live in a state ruled by Jewish law. Members of this subgroup are more likely to say that they would be happy to get to know non-Haredim, most closely identify with the state, are least likely to say that they feel detached from the state. As a whole, they are more likely to hold right-wing positions on the Israel-Palestinian conflict. A high percentage of this group wants to see Haredim in academia, and they attached a greater degree of importance to economic well-being than other subgroups. Additionally, a higher percentage of people in this subgroup engage in charitable activity (gemachim).

Together with the desire to integrate comes the desire to influence, which comes into fruition by their sweeping support for Israel as a halachic state (state governed by Jewish law), high level of satisfaction with the demographic prediction of Israel being majority Haredi in the future, and their belief that the role of the Haredi community is to protect the Jewish nature of the State. Additionally, members of this subgroup are unflinching in their support and deference to Rabbinic authority.

**Defining Demographic Characteristics:** Relatively higher percentage of Sephardim, and more than 80% of the men are in Torah studies.

**3. Humanitarian under Halakhic Sanction (16.6%)**

The defining characteristic of this subgroup is their more humanitarian approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (a relatively high percentage of them support giving humanitarian aid to Gaza, are against settlement expansion and don’t reject “land for peace”), combined with a very pious, Haredi point of view. Halacha plays an essential role in this grouping’s world of meaning. They, more than other groups, believe that the positions of their Rabbis aren’t influenced by outside actors and a halachic state is important to them. They believe in Torah-based education and are against
the introduction of the core curriculum. On their vacations, they visit holy sites. A separatist lifestyle is the dominant characteristic of this subgroup. Similar to group 1 (Four Cubits of Halacha) a high percentage of group members live in separate neighborhoods. They’re not interested in seeing Haredim learning in secular academic institutions, and are against the recruitment of Haredi to the Israeli Army. More than others, they’re opposed to Haredi consumption of secular media. A high percentage of them don’t have internet access, even so-called “Kosher” internet.

**Defining Demographic Characteristics:** Roughly a third are learning and a quarter define themselves as learning and working, and more than half are “Lithuanian” (non-Hasidic Haredim).

4. Integrating Liberals (8.3%)

The **Defining Characteristic** of the members of this grouping is their desire to integrate into the state and to general Israeli society, and they are more liberal in terms of the issues of separation from society and gender segregation. They seem themselves as having independent opinions, and are less likely to consider the opinions of the Rabbis. They support the enlistment of Haredi men who aren’t studying into the army and support increased integration of Haredim into academia and the workforce. A high percentage of them indicate that they identify with the country. Members of this group support at relatively higher rates secular studies education in schools, and as such that their children will study the core curriculum. Gender separation in the public square isn’t important to them, and the majority of them are even willing to work in a job without separation between men and women; they also support women in managerial roles. They’re in favor of the exposure of Haredi society to secular media and journalism, and a high percentage of them read non-Haredi or even non-Jewish literature. Additionally, a high percentage of them have internet access. The members of this group indicate that they like to spoil themselves with shopping purchases more than other groupings, and additionally they are more likely to go on vacation.

**Defining Demographic Characteristics:** a lower percentage of group members are learning than in any other subgroup, but a high percentage of them have academic degrees. A relatively higher percentage are Sephardic and almost two thirds live in mixed neighborhoods. Two thirds have five or fewer children.

5. Free-Thinkers Who Maintain a Haredi Lifestyle (8.2%)

The **Defining Characteristic** of the members of this subgroup is their openness toward the “Non-Haredi” world with a coterminous preservation of a Haredi lifestyle. This group is defined by a high level of thoughtfulness which results in a predilection to doubt the decisions of Rabbis and to place less trust in the Rabbinate. That being said, they prefer to go on vacation in a place that only has Haredim. The members of this subgroup are in favor of Torah-based education with some level of core curriculum included. Their Haredi traditional nature is seen in that many of them believe that weddings should be arranged only through matchmakers and that they are against consumption of non-Haredi media. Additionally, most of them don’t support women being placed in managerial positions. Their openness is demonstrated by their interest in meeting secular people and their relatively higher rates of support for the integration of
Haredim in the workforce and in academia. They’re less opposed to secular studies, and most of them identify with the State. Politically, their views tend to lean to the left of the political map – they’re not against “Land for Peace” and a high percentage of them support the evacuation of settlements as part of a possible Two-State Solution. Additionally, they are in favor of equal rights for Arabs.

**Defining Demographic Characteristics:** This group is relatively older – two thirds of them are over the age of 35. A third of them learn and another third learn and work, two thirds of them are men, and a quarter of them live in separate neighborhoods.

6. **Enjoy (or at least want to enjoy) the Best of Both Worlds (7.9%)**

The **Defining Characteristic** of the members of this subgroup is the importance of the Haredi world for them and their interest in sampling from the world beyond it. On one hand, they would want - to the point of consensus - to see Israel as a halachic state, and they’re certain that the role of the Haredi society in Israel is to preserve Judaism, and they’re in favor of a high level of Rabbinic control. On the other hand, separation is less important to them, demonstrated by the high percentage of them that have no issue being exposed to non-Haredi media and their desire to meet non-Haredim. The desire to be a part of the Israeli society is shown by their desire to see more Haredim in academia, support of Haredim that don’t learn enlisting in the IDF, lack of opposition to the core curriculum, willingness to go on vacation in non-Haredi locations, lack of support for gender segregation in public places, and lower levels of support with the idea that Haredi education better prepares one for life than secular education. Another interesting statistic about this demographic is that they are in favor of family planning at a higher rate than the other subgroups.

Members of this subgroup place a higher level of importance in being economically well-off, which comes together with an interest in shopping and buying goods. They are more exposed to non-Haredi media than the other subgroups, and roughly 50% have access to non-kosher internet. 30% of them have Facebook accounts, and more than half listen to non-religious music frequently and read books by secular or non-Jewish authors. Around a quarter watch TV or listen to sports radio, and they are less likely to oppose “immodest” advertisements.

**Defining Demographic Characteristics:** the percentage of group members who are learning is the lowest of any subgroup, and a high percentage of them are middle or upper-middle class. They are more likely to be Mizrahi and the majority of them live in mixed neighborhoods.

7. **Want to be Part of a Democratic State (6.7%) (Understand the meaning of a Haredi Majority – and don’t want it)**

The **Defining Characteristic** of this subgroup is their fear of a Haredi takeover of the country together with a sense of nationalism which leads them to support the integration of Haredim into the country and the general society. This is the group whose members fear the demographic projections that Israel will have a Haredi majority in the coming decades. More than others, they are afraid of Haredi control of the state and oppose Israeli becoming a halachic-based state. They don’t feel that the role of the Haredi community is to preserve the Jewish nature of the country. They’re not opposed to public transportation on Shabbat in secular
towns, and they want to see Haredim integrated in the workforce and in academia, as well as supporting the enlistment of Haredim who don’t study in Yeshivas into the IDF. They’re not in favor of separation from the rest of society, and want to be engaged in non-Haredi society. They describe themselves as wanting to meet more secular people, and in general interact more with non-Haredim. They’re willing to work in workplaces without gender separation, and separation in public spaces is less important to them. The members of this group are exposed to non-Haredi media at a high rate, and are more likely to have access to “non-Kosher” internet than any other subgroup. A high percentage of them read books by non-Haredi or non-Jewish writers.

**Defining Demographic Characteristics**: this is the youngest group – more than half of its members are under age 35 - and 2/3 of them are men. One third live in mixed neighborhoods.
Mizrachi identity can be considered fluid. President Rivlin did not include it as one of his four tribes, preferring to see their primary, tribal identity as dividing between Haredi, Religious Zionist or secular identity. But Mizrachi identity is central to the changing landscape of Israel. Over 40% of Israeli Jews come from a Mizrachi background, and one senses the growing presence of Mizrachi culture in the Israeli public square. The changing face of Israel is intimately linked with the weakening of Ashkenazic dominance, and a rising Mizrachi presence defining Israeli society, culture and politics.

1000 respondents were interviewed who either were born in the Middle East or North Africa, or with at least one parent or grandparent who was born there, regardless of the extent to which they defined themselves as “Mizrachim.” In broad strokes, one sees a population that is committed to tradition, right-leaning politically relative to the larger population, aware of discrimination in the past but ambivalent about discrimination in the present, being Jewish and Israeli (but not necessarily Mizrachi) as central characteristics of their identity, open to changes in traditional sex roles, and experiencing social-economic mobility. When looking for what separates the various Mizrachi respondents, the central predictor of differences was self-definition of their identity. Those that claimed higher percentages of their identity were Mizrachi (“what percentage of your identity is Jewish? Israeli? Mizrachi? Country of origin – Moroccan, Tunisian, Iraqi, Yemenite etc.”), also saw tradition as more important, were more comfortable in the company of other Mizrachim, were doing less well economically than their parents, justified politicians who emphasize discrimination against Mizrachim, and leaned farther right. A strong particularly Mizrachi identity was never found statistically to the left of the political map. So, for example, the mixing of a strong Mizrachi identification along with a leftist “politics of recognition,” has today no natural constituency. On the left one would find those whose identity was primarily defined as “Israeli”, with the middle of the map dominated by respondents with various degrees of Jewish and Israeli identity. These conflicting answers to the survey served as the basis to create six archetypes of Mizrachim in Israel, with suggestive results. Interestingly and importantly, the largest archetype (29.5%) whom we coined “A Good Place in the Middle,” responded to most questions exactly in between the two poles, and were the only archetype to define their identity overwhelmingly as both Israeli and Jewish, in equal measures. In many ways they represent the middle-class Mizrachi sociology. Additional subgroups include “Feeling of Deprivation and Exclusion” (8% of respondents), “Tradition, Religion, and Tradition” (17%), “Pride and Belonging” (19% of respondents), "Givatayim" (13%), and "Tel Avivians" (14%). Here is a description of each of the typologies, which allows us to have a more nuanced view of the values that comprise Mizrahi society today, and where partners for a future of the Common Good can be found:

1. **Feeling of Deprivation and Exclusion, 7.5%**
   Average Self-categorization: 26.8% Israeli Identity, 25.2% Jewish Identity, 43.9% Mizrahi identity, 4.1% country of origin identity

Members of this subgroup are highly traditional and connected to their Mizrachi identity – they feel the highest sense of identification with the so-called Mizrachi “tribe;” they also strongly feel that there is both symbolic and day-to-day discrimination against Mizrachim in Israel and that Mizrachim and Ashkenazim
are unequal. They see few opportunities for economic advancement and feel that their economic situation is negatively effected by their ethnic background. They are also the most likely to support Mizrachi identity politics and politicians, and are right-leaning and primarily vote for the Likud party. They feel much more comfortable when in primarily Mizrachi social situations, and the majority are married to Mizrachi partners; they are more likely to prefer that their children marry Mizrahs. They identify as traditional and are slightly less educated than the other subgroups.

2. Tradition, Religion, and Tradition, 17%  
Average Self-categorization: 11% Israeli Identity, 80.1% Jewish Identity, 5.6% Mizrahi identity, 3.3% country of origin identity

Jewish identity and the preservation of tradition are essential for members of this subgroup – they are the most likely to keep Kosher and to expect their children to as well, and a majority identify as either Haredi or religious. They are also the most right-wing of all the subgroups, with a particular high concentration of voters of the ultra-Orthodox Mizrachi Shas party. They prefer that their children marry Mizrahs, and hold on to many vestiges of Mizrachi culture from the “old country” such as the Mizrachi “het” and “ayin.” They are relatively young and less well off, and are more likely to live in Jerusalem than members of the other subgroups.

3. Pride and belonging, 19%  
Average self-categorization: 22.8% Israeli Identity, 32.4% Jewish Identity, 19.7% Mizrahi identity, 25.2% country of origin identity

This subgroup is defined by its strong identification with their countries of origin (Moroccan, Tunisian, Yemenite, Libyan, etc.) being stronger than their Israeli identity or collective Mizrachi identity). Members of this group trend center-right politically, and are primarily Likud voters. Tradition is important to them – they keep kosher and they want their children to be traditional. Out of all survey respondents, they are most likely to celebrate holidays related to their countries of origin. They feel that there’s inequality between Mizrahs and Ashkenazis, and support Mizrachi politicians fighting this discrimination. They feel a lack of representation by the state – for example, in issues such as the lack of Mizrahi representation on currency bill and Mizrachi religious traditions not being taught in school. They report feeling slightly more comfortable in a Mizrahi-dominated social situation. Overall, they are less educated and slightly less well-off socioeconomically, and more than 75% have Mizrahi partners.

4. A Good Place in The Middle, 29.5% of respondents  
Average Self-categorization: 43.3% Israeli Identity, 47.6% Jewish Identity, 6.4% Mizrahi identity, 2.7% country of origin identity

The members of this subgroup, the biggest one found in the survey, see themselves as being in the middle – between left and right, and combining strong Israeli and Jewish identities. They don’t feel a sense of discrimination or exclusion based on ethnicity. The oldest subgroup – 75% of them are over age 35, but less likely to be over age 65. The strongest economically as well as the most educated. Slightly more likely to identify as traditional and slightly less likely to identify as Religious/Haredi.
5. Givatayim, 13%
Average Self-categorization: 54.3% Israeli Identity, 23.2% Jewish Identity, 12.6% Mizrahi identity, 9.9% country of origin identity

This subgroup is named after an upper-middle class, center-left-leaning suburb of Tel Aviv, and can be seen as being a slightly less extreme version of the Tel Aviv subgroup: while its strongly identify as Israeli as opposed to Mizrachi or even Jewish, they do so at a rate slightly lower than members of the Tel Aviv sub-group, they are less concerned with keeping traditions than average, although more so than the “Tel-Avivis”, and lean centrist to center-left: 40% voted for Kulanu, while 40% voted for either Yesh Atid or the Zionist Union. They see their Mizrahi identity as being a pathway to better understand Arabs. They are slightly younger than the other subgroups, and slightly more than 50% identify as secular, less than the Tel Aviv group. Members of this group are more likely to be Iraqi at a statistically significant rate.

6. Tel Aviv, 14%
Average Self-categorization: 84.9% Israeli Identity, 9.9% Jewish Identity, 4.3% Mizrahi identity, 1% country of origin identity

This group is named after the cultural capital of secular Israel, and its adherents reflect this moniker in their self-identification - when asked to choose between Israeli and Jewish identity, they overwhelmingly choose Israeli. They are the least closely identified with markers of Mizrahi identity and tradition - they are least likely to speak with a Mizrahi “accent” or to say that keeping ethnic or religious traditions is important, and least likely to keep Kosher. They are center-left leaning - particularly voting for Yesh Atid and the Zionist Union - and are least likely to support Mizrahi identity politicians. Indeed, they are unlikely to feel that their ethnic background at all limits their advancement in society and feel that Ashkenazim and Mizrahim are equal in society; about half are married to non-Mizrahim. They are primarily middle-aged (75% are over age 35) and well-off economically, more likely to live in the center of the country (the Tel Aviv metro) and identify as secular, and are more likely to be of Egyptian, Turkish, or Syrian origin.
The findings of the survey bear witness to a wide-ranging desire among the Arab Citizens of Israel to integrate into the wider society. When trying to understand what is meant by integration, differences of opinion are shown about the level of integration desired and to what extent. Differences of opinion about central issues in Israeli society also emerge, largely mapping onto different perceptions about what levels of integration are possible and desired. The survey also posits a segmentation of the Arab population based on their answers to questions relating to the above issues, presenting four potential subgroups that can be delineated based on their relative alignment on an “integration versus separation” continuum.

### Overall Satisfaction with Life in General and Life in Israel in Particular

The majority of respondents are satisfied with their lives in general, and agree with the sentiment that they are offered more opportunities than previous generations. That being said, there is a rather significant difference of opinions as to whether the mechanisms of the State create opportunities for Arab-Israelis (with similar levels of agreement and disagreement), and a high percentage feels that status of Arabs in Israel has not improved in recent years - 41% say that it hasn’t improved, while 30% say that it has.

### Relationships with Jews and Israeli Society

The desire of Arab-Israelis to be part of Israel and connected with Jews is clear: 88% of all respondents reported that they that are ready to work in a place where Arabs and Jews work together, and around 50% of survey respondents support the integration of Arabs into the police force. Nearly half of respondents said that would like to expand their circle of Jewish acquaintances, and a similar number noted that they feel comfortable in predominantly Jewish surroundings. Nearly half of respondents reported that they are not afraid to be around Jews during periods of tensions due to the security situation.

### Equality for Women – Traditions – Modernity – The West

76% of all respondents to the survey reported that they support men taking a more active and significant role in childrearing and housework. Additionally, two-thirds of respondents reported that they would like to see more women involved in local and national politics. Cross-referencing the responses to different questions asked about issues of preserving tradition, culture, and opinions about western cultures reveals interesting results: While 71% of survey participants reported that their friends viewed them as “modern,” only one-third of respondents expressed a desire to live in a society similar to that of western countries. Additionally, while an overwhelming majority reported keeping religious traditions, only one-third of respondents reported that they keep traditions as a result of social pressure. This data seems to suggest a strong desire to preserve culture and existing traditions along with a developing modern worldview, one that does not necessarily desire to imitate the West.

### The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The views of the Israeli Arab community on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are varied, even while as a whole strongly supporting the Palestinian side in the conflict. One-third of respondents agree that the Land of Israel/Historic Palestine is the homeland of the Jewish people just as much as it is the homeland of the Palestinians, and one-third disagree. Over 50% disagree that Jews should...
be allowed to pray on the Temple Mount in any circumstance, whereas 25% are willing if it doesn’t endanger the status of the Moslem Holy Sites.

**Arab Citizens of Israel Cannot Be Defined as a Singular Grouping**

The results of the survey demonstrate that Israeli-Arab society cannot be viewed as a monolithic block. When the main issues of contemporary Israeli society are considered, contradictory trends can be seen within Arab society. In order to highlight these tensions and complexities, the survey proposes a psychographic segmentation of the Arab society into four subgroups representing the different trends and directions present within the population. Such a segmentation enables a deeper understanding of the society than one based on answers to the questions asked alone. As part of the process of creating these subgroups, a “self-identification” question was provided to respondents in which they were asked to describe their own identity by dividing it into percentages based on its relative importance to their identity. The following categories were offered: Arab, Palestinian, Religious (i.e. Muslim, Christian, or Druze), and Israeli. Respondents answers to this question served as a central tool in discerning the ultimate segmentation.

**Overall Average Identification Self-Categorization:**

36% Religious Identity, 28% Arab Identity, 20.6% Israeli Identity, 14.8% Palestinian Identity

The results of the survey, and the segmentation part of it in particular, testify to the complexity of the divisions within Arab-Israeli society and to the level of differentiation and division within it when it comes to the central issues of Israeli society today. They also break down the correlation that is made in Israeli society between level of religiosity and particular political and/or nationalistic beliefs.

**The Subgroups of Arab-Israeli Society**

Four subgroups were identified as a result of the survey: the integrators (36% of respondents); the conservatives (21%); those just getting by economically (19%); and the separatists/seclusionists (24%). Note that there is some overlapping between the groups - the division into subgroups should be looked at as more of a spectrum than as four groups with clearly defined borders.

**Subgroup #1: The Integrationists - 36% of Respondents**

Average self-categorization: 31.6% Religious, 28.5% Arab, 27.9% Israeli, 11.5% Palestinian

This group reported the highest level of Israeli identity. It contains a mix of religious, traditional, and secular Arab Citizens of Israel, with a relatively higher percentage of secular respondents than the other groups. Just as with the other subgroups, there is a definite Muslim majority, but this subgroup contains relatively more Christians and Druze than the others. The members of this group adopt liberal and modern identities, and report that they are interested in being part of an open society. They are satisfied with their lives and feel that they have more opportunities than their parents did, yet feel that the situation of the Arabs in Israel has not improved in the last five years. They support integration into the police and diplomatic corps, and reported moderate responses to questions on the subject of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and societal issues.
Subgroup #2: The Traditionalists - 21% of Respondents  
Average self-categorization: 44.3% Religious, 24.4% Arab, 20.4% Israeli, 9.9% Palestinian

Religious identity and tradition are dominant when it comes to this subgroup, who noted that keeping traditions is no less important for them than it was for their parents. When compared to the other groups, Bedouins are more highly represented in this category. The members of this subgroup noted that it was important for them that women wear the headcovering (hijab), and they oppose enforcing the law against polygamy, which is still practiced in significant parts of Bedouin society. At the same time, they supported men taking on a larger role at home and women participating in politics, albeit at a relatively lower rate than the other groups. On average, they are the group that least desires to live in a Western-like society. They feel more comfortable than the average respondent in a predominantly Jewish environment. Overall, their answers to questions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and security issues were close to the average for all survey respondents.

Subgroup #3: Those Just Getting By ("Surviving") Economically - 19% of Respondents  
Average self-categorization: 31.3% Religious, 30.05% Arab, 21% Israeli, 17.1% Palestinian

The socioeconomic status of this group is the lowest of all the subgroups, and is much lower than that of the average Israeli in general. The respondents in this subgroup are not satisfied with their lives, they believe that the status of Arabs in Israeli society has not improved in the last five years, and they report that they experienced discrimination due to being identified as Arabs. Subgroup members reported that they don’t feel comfortable in the Israeli society, and some feel that Jews in Israel as a whole hate Arabs. Despite their economic challenges, their responses to questions about the central issues in Israeli society can be described as relatively moderate, including in core issues such as the conflict. The members of the group divided their identities relatively evenly.

Subgroup #4: Separatists - 24% of respondents  
Average self-categorization: 38% Religious, 30% Arab, 21% Palestinian, 9% Israeli

A significant percentage of this group self-identify primarily as Palestinians, and their answers to the questions suggest a strong tendency for a separatist ethnic and political identity. They strongly favor more nationalist positions in response to questions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The respondents who fall within this category answered similarly in regards to questions on the major issues facing Israeli society today, and its members object to the integration of Arab Citizens of Israel into state institutions such as the police and the diplomatic corps. They prefer to live in Arab-only communities, report feeling uncomfortable in predominantly Jewish surroundings, and are not interested in expanding their circle of Jewish acquaintances. It’s important to take into account that this group includes a higher-percentage of more economically well-off participants than the other subgroups. Its members describe themselves as liberal and modern, and a higher percentage identify as secular than in any other subgroup. Palestinian identity is the central marker of identity for this group, and the “Israeli” percentage the lowest out of any subgroup.
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